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Quebec's Comprehensive Auto No-Fault 
Scheme and the Failure of Any of the 
United States to Follow 
Stephen D. SUGARMAN* 
Although Quebec's no-fault auto insurance scheme has served for 
20 years as an exemplary model to follow, so far not one of the United 
States has adopted anything even close to it. This article examines the 
reasons for that failure, both in California and throughout the country. 
Emphasis is given to several factors that stand in the way of U.S. reform 
and that may distinguish states in the U.S. from Canadian provinces 
generally and Quebec in particular: 1. State politics — the power of the 
lawyers who represent victims, the position of the insurers, and the struc-
ture of state government. 2. Public perceptions—negative attitudes towards 
government, the insurance industry, and the prospects of saving money on 
auto insurance premiums. 3. Traditions the ideological strength of indi-
vidualism and ideological weakness of collective responsibility. 4. Trade-
offs doing away with the tort system means giving up more in the U.S. 
than elsewhere. 5 Policy concerns fears about safety costs and the 
« slippery slope ». Finally the possibility that one or more U.S. states might 
in the future evolve towards the Quebec solution is explored 
Même si le régime québécois d'assurance automobile constitue un 
modèle à suivre depuis 20 ans, aucun État américain n 'a encore adopté un 
système d'indemnisation qui s'en approche. Le présent texte expose les 
raisons qui expliquent cet échec, tant en Californie qu 'ailleurs aux États-
Unis. Il fatt ressortir les facteurs propres à ce dernier pays, qui permettent 
de distinguer la situation américaine de celle des provinces canadiennes, en 
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pariiculier le Québec ; 1) Facteuss politiquss — le pouvoir des avocats qui 
représentent les victime,, la situation dans laquelle se retrouvent les assu-
reurs et le mode d'organisation des gouvernements ; 2) Les perceptions du 
pubiic — méfiance à l'égard du gouvernement, des compagnies d'assu-
rance et de la promesee d'une réduciion des primes d'assurance automo-
bile; 3) Les traditions — l'individualisme américain et le faible degré de 
pénétration d'une idée de responsabilité colleciive ; 4) Compromis—aban-
donner le système américain de responsabilité civile implique la renoncia-
tion à plus de choses qu 'ailleurs dans le monde ; 5) Considérations d'ordre 
général — craintes au niveau de la sécurité routière, des coûts et de V« effet 
d'entraînement ». Enfin, l'auteur examine la possibilité qu'un ou plusieurs 
États américains puissent, à l'avenir, élaborer un système inspiré du mo-
dèle québécois. 
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Quebec adopted a comprehensive auto no-fault plan more than twenty 
years ago1. As will be detailed below, it has apparently served Quebec very 
well. This approach has been pointed to with envy by no-fault devotees in 
other jurisdictions on both sides of the Canadian-U.S. border2. Yet, during 
this period, not one of the United States has embraced the Quebec example. 
In this article, I will discuss some reasons for this failure to act. At the end, 
I will explore ways in which some U.S. jurisdictions might begin to move in 
Quebec's direction. Although I will give special attention to the situation in 
California where I am based, my analysis is meant to apply generally across 
the U.S. 
1. A Brief History of Auto No-Fault in North America 
1.1 Beginnings 
In North America, auto no-fault insurance began in Canada with the 
adoption of a scheme by Saskatchewan in 19463. This was one of the models 
pointed to by Professors Robert Keeton and Jeffrey O'Connell when they 
published their famous blueprint for U.S.-style, auto no-fault in 19654. In the 
U.S,, a somewhat more modest version of the Keeton-O'Connell plan was 
adopted in 1970 by Massachusetts (where Keeton then taught and where 
auto insurance rates were annoyingly high)5. In the next few years, many 
other states and provinces followed suit6. 
1. Automobile Insurance Act, R.S.Q. 1977, c. A-25. 
2. See e.g., J. O'CONNELL and C. TENSER, «North America's Most Ambitious No-Fault 
Law : Quebec's Auto Insurance Act », (1987) 24 San Diego L. Rev. 917 ; J. DAW, « Does 
Quebec Have the Answer?», The [Toronto] Star (16 May 1995) Dl. See also the text 
of N. Weatherston published in this issue. 
3. M.A. FRANKLIN, Tort Law and Alternatives, 2nd ed., Mineola, The Foundation Press, 
1979, pp. 797-798 ; R. KEETON and J. O'CONNELL, Basic Protection for the Traffic 
Victim : A Blueprint for Reforming Auto Insurance, Toronto, Little, Brown and Co., 
1965. 
4. R. KEETON and J. O'CONNELL, op. cit., note 3. 
5. M.A. FRANKLIN and R.L. RABIN, Tort Law and Alternatives, 6th ed., Westbury, The 
Foundation Press, 1996. 
6. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, State No-Fault Automobile Insurance 
Experience 1971-1977, Washington, Department of Transportation, June 1977, pp. 6-12 2 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Compensating Auto Accident Victims: A 
Follow Up Report on No-Fault Insurance Experiences, Washington, Govt. Print. Off., 
May 1985, pp. 23-24. 
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1.2 Partial Plans in the U.S. 
Yet, in the U.S. neither the Keeton-O'Connell proposal nor the enacted 
plans were comprehensive. Basically, the approach that won political 
acceptance in the 1970s was rooted in the goal of trying to rid the legal 
system of the huge mass of auto accident cases involving small injuries. 
These little cases were swamping the system. They took what seemed like 
ages to resolve. Some victims were obtaining substantial awards for pain 
and suffering for minor injuries, injuries that were long healed, and in some 
senses forgotten, well before the matter was put to rest legally. Other 
victims were getting nothing. Enormous legal fees and other expenses were 
incurred on both sides. Therefore, the thinking that won the day in nearly 
two dozen legislatures was that everyone would be better off if these little 
cases could be taken care of quickly, with all auto victims being assured that 
their medical expenses in minor injury cases were paid for and that at least 
a moderate amount of their wage loss was replaced. Put differently, why not 
dispense with often fruitless and costly inquiries into «fault» when the 
money spent on transactions costs could be put to use instead either to 
compensate victims who failed to recover under tort law or else to reduce 
auto insurance premiums7 ? 
In some states, no-fault plans have successfully removed at least a 
substantial share of the smaller claims from the tort system. This goal was 
generally best achieved in jurisdictions that imposed a formal legal hurdle 
to the recovery of damages in tort for pain and suffering. In those states, 
minor injury victims effectively had no-fault benefits as their only remedy. 
These are generally termed the «modified» jurisdictions—because the 
right to tort recovery is modified8. 
Other states, however, imposed no restriction on tort recovery for pain 
and suffering and their no-fault schemes are generally termed the « add on » 
plans9. There, the only limit in tort is that claimants can't recover damages 
for items already compensated by no-fault benefits. The hope for fewer tort 
claims in these states depends on the willingness of the victim voluntarily to 
7. M.A. FRANKLIN and R.L. RABIN, op. cit., note 5, pp. 756-757 (reprinting, Automobile 
Insurance... For Whose Benefit ?, A Report to Governor Nelson A. Rockefeller by the 
INSURANCE DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, Albany, Insurance Department, 
1970, pp. 17-44). 
8. See, e.g., J. O'CONNELL and J. BARKER, « Compensation for Injury & Illness : An Update 
of the Conrad-Morgan Study », (1986) 47 Ohio St. L. J. 913,930 ; see also M.A. FRANKLIN 
and R.L. RABIN, op. cit., note 5, pp. 756-757 (referring to «mixed» plans). 
9. R.H. JOOST, Automoblle Insurance and No-Fault Law, 2nd ed., Deerfield, Clark, Board-
man & Callaghan, 1992, section 1:1,3; J. O'CONNELL and J. BARKER, loc. cit., note 8, 
930. 
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settle for prompt coverage of out of pocket losses and to forego the litigation 
route. While this seemed to have occurred in Saskatchewan under its 
original « add on » scheme10, in the U.S. no-fault benefits in « add-on » states 
all too often have served instead to encourage claimants to file tort claims 
and then to refuse to settle early because the no-fault benefits took care of 
their basic needs1 '. It should be no surprise that the U.S. « add-on » schemes 
have tended to increase auto insurance premiums overall12. 
Fewer than a handful of the states removed even a modest share of the 
more serious injuries out of the tort system. To do so basically requires a 
combination of a) generous no-fault benefits for economic loss and b) a high 
« serious injury » threshold on suits for pain and suffering damages. Indeed, 
in the U.S. it is probably fair to say that really only Michigan and New York 
(two states bordering Canada) have adopted anything like a widespread 
auto no-fault plan. Even in those two jurisdictions, however, the most 
serious injuries have continued to be handled by tort law and not by 
no-fault. In Michigan, for example, about half of a motorist's insurance 
premium for bodily injury continues to fall on the liability insurance side 
(and about half on the no-fault side)13. 
As auto no-fault became a hot issue in the U.S. in the 1960s and 1970s, 
some insurers proposed a « comprehensive » solution14. There would be no 
more tort remedy at all against other motorists (apart perhaps from inten-
tional injury and drunk driving cases). But all (or virtually all) auto accident 
victims would be reimbursed for their full economic losses, usually from 
their own insurer, regardless of who might have been at fault in causing the 
accident. The argument on behalf of the comprehensive solution was that 
the most important benefits of the no-fault approach were just as applicable 
to serious auto injuries as they were to minor ones. In short, under this 
sweeping approach, auto insurance for bodily injury would become like 
insurance for the loss of one's vehicle owing to fire or theft. 
Yet, rather than expanding on the initial, more-modest auto no-fault 
legislation, states went off in the other direction. Not only did the U.S. 
10. M.A. FRANKLIN, op. cit., note 3, p. 798. 
11. J. O'CONNELL and R.H. JOOST, « A Model Bill Allowing Choice Between Auto Insurance 
Payable With and Without Regard to Fault», (1990) 51 Ohio St. L. J. 947, 947-948. 
12. See, e.g., U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, op. cit., note 6 (May 1985) ; J. O CON-
NELL and R.H. JOOST, « Giving Motorists a Choice Between Fault and No-Fault Insu-
rance», (1986) 72 Va. L. Rev. 61. 
13. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, op. cit., note 6, p. 34 (May 1985). 
14. M.A. FRANKLIN, op. cit., note 3, pp. 801-803 (citing plan by American Insurance Asso-
ciation recommending comprehensive no-fault system and abolition of all tort law for 
automobile accidents). 
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no-fault movement come to a halt, but a few states even repealed their 
no-fault plans15. Moreover, in Michigan the most recent political response 
designed to reduce premiums (so far unsuccessful) has been to try to reduce 
no-fault coverage rather than to widen tort law's repeal16. And in New York, 
there seems to be no visible support to expand its plan to be as generous as 
Michigan's. 
1.3 Bolder Plans in Canada 
In Canada the story has been very different. Following the early 
Saskatchewan initiative, many provinces adopted no-fault plans and later 
expanded them17. Quebec, as noted at the outset, made the most dramatic 
reform by adopting a comprehensive scheme in 1977. In more recent years, 
Manitoba enacted a comprehensive scheme18 and Saskatchewan expanded 
its plan to make it fully comprehensive19. 
2. Why Has No State Followed the Quebec Example ? 
By now, the Quebec model is hardly new. To the contrary, it has for 
two decades been there to be seen, studied and followed (or to be modified 
and then followed). Yet, not one of the American states has chosen to do so. 
Is this because the Quebec solution is a bad idea, or at least would be in the 
U.S. ? If not, then why has it been rejected? Let me turn to a series of 
reasons that, I believe, explain our inaction south-of-the-border. 
2.1 Politics 
2.1.1 The Power of the Plaintiffs' Lawyers 
Due to the « checks and balances » system of state politics in the U.S., 
the election of a candidate from a particular party, favorable to your inte-
rests, to the top job (i.e., governor) hardly suffices to ensure favorable 
legislative outcomes—as it may in Canadian provinces. This is because the 
other major political party may still control one or the other (or both) houses 
of the state legislature, hence controlling the committees through which 
legislation must pass. Moreover, sometimes a member of the governor's or 
dominant party will maintain control over a key legislative committee and 
yet have a different agenda from that of the governor or the party generally. 
15. R.H. JOOST, op. cit., note 9, p. 8, section 1:2. 
16. R.H. JOOST, Automobile Insurance and No-Fault Law, 2nd ed., Deerfield, Clark, Board-
man & Callaghan, Supp. 1997, p. 29, section 1:2D. 
17. R.H. JOOST, op. cit., note 9, p. 6, section 1:2. 
18. R.H. JOOST, op. cit., note 16, p. 118, section 7:6. 
19. Id., p. 53. 
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These key committee chairs have enormous power to block legislative 
reform. 
Given this system, in the U.S., so-called « special interests » are often 
able to influence the outcome of political issues of particular concern to 
them. One of the best ways is to have built up the support of legislators who 
chair or serve on committees with jurisdiction over the matters most salient 
to the special interest group. And one way to win that support is through 
campaign contributions. In most states in the U.S., lawyers who represent 
accident victims have organized themselves to take advantage of the politi-
cal and campaign contributions systems, and have, as a result, obtained 
considerable leverage with key state legislators. In general, the plaintiffs' 
bar has allied itself with and funded Democrats, and like the Democratic 
party, the lawyers portray themselves as the defenders of ordinary people 
(consumers and victims). They characterize their opponents, the Republi-
cans, as representatives of the powerful corporate interests in the society. 
So, for example, when the business community seeks to limit the 
amount of money that accident victims can recover under tort law for pain 
and suffering, the Democratic legislators and the plaintiffs' lawyers form a 
natural alliance in opposition. The self-interest of the lawyers in this and 
similar settings is clear, especially because of the near universal practice 
in the U.S. of lawyers handling personal injury cases on a contingent per-
centage basis. That is, legal fees typically are approximately 1/3 of the total 
recovery, and so any change that reduces what victims may be awarded 
directly reduces the lawyers' incomes as well. 
Yet sometimes the interests of consumers and victims may not coin-
cide with those of the trial lawyers. Quebec-style auto no-fault is a good 
example. The Quebec plan's supporters claim that it benefits consumers 
enormously by providing quick and generous compensation to more victims 
at a lower overall cost to motorists. But since one of the main effects of 
implementing Quebec's comprehensive no-fault plan in the U.S. would be 
to reduce plaintiff personal injury lawyers' fees dramatically, it should not 
be surprising that these lawyers have tried to discredit its attractiveness as 
a consumer/victim measure. 
In California, for example, comprehensive automobile no-fault plans 
appear to have no chance legislatively so long as Democratic friends of the 
trial lawyers' lobby control one of the key committees (Insurance or Judi-
ciary) in either the state Senate or Assembly (something they have done for 
many years now despite the election of Republican governors). This has 
prompted proponents of auto no-fault to seek reform through the « initia-
tive » process. A frequently employed mechanism in California and a few 
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other states, initiatives are a way that citizens may force a popular vote on 
matter, in effect bypassing the ordinary legislative process. 
For example, in 1988, key players in the auto insurance industry spon-
sored Proposition 104. By this I mean that industry leaders drafted the 
initiative, paid people to gather the required number of voter signatures 
needed to get the measure put on the ballot, and then carried the lion's share 
of the cost of advertising and other measures carried out on its behalf20. 
Proposition 104 was by no means a comprehensive auto no-fault 
scheme. It was, rather, a modest «modified» plan providing moderate 
no-fault benefits and curtailing tort law recovery for pain and suffering in 
less serious injury cases. This measure was badly defeated by the voters21. 
In the 1990s a new effort was launched. This time a comprehensive auto 
no-fault plan was put on the ballot in the spring of 1996 in the form of 
Proposition 200. This measure would have provided victim compensation 
broadly comparable to what Quebec provides, and it would have eliminated 
nearly as much of the tort law as Quebec has eliminated. But, unlike Quebec, 
this proposal assumed that private insurers would continue to sell and 
administer the no-fault-bodily-injury insurance mandated by the plan. 
Proposition 200 was the brainchild of a gadfly U.S. reformer named Andrew 
Tobias who lives in Florida, writes national columns for prominent publica-
tions, and had been promoting versions of auto no-fault for years. The 
insurance industry lent some support to the effort. Tobias also obtained 
considerable financial backing from parts of the business community (espe-
cially high tech companies located in California's Silicon Valley) by yoking 
his measure politically to two other ballot initiatives that were also adver-
tised as litigation-reducers22. Proposition 200 was also strongly rejected by 
the voters (65 % to 35 %)23. 
20. It is now common that ballot initiatives in California are actually promoted by well-
organized interest groups rather than loose collections of grass roots voters who have 
arisen to support a cause — defeating the original vision behind the initiative process. 
So, too, it is common for sponsors to pay people to collect the signatures necessary to 
put initiatives on the ballot. See A. TOBIAS, « Ralph Nader is a Big Fat Idiot », Worth 
(Oct. 1996) 92, at 100. 
21. Proposition 104 was defeated 74 to 26%. See The [San Diego] Union Tribune (9 No-
vember 1988) A4. 
22. See A. TOBIAS, he. cit., note 20,105. Proposition 201 would have limited people's right 
to sue when the value of stock they bought dropped, and would have helped high tech 
enterprises especially. Proposition 202 was designed to reduce legal fees in cases taken 
on a contingent fee basis. Id., at 172-173. 
23. The [San Francisco] Examiner (27 March 1996) A6. 
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The plaintiffs' lawyers' lobby in California was the main source of the 
funds that were used to advertise against both Propositions 104 and 20024. 
They were also the main opponents in Hawaii where the legislature in 1995 
passed a comprehensive no-fault scheme that would have expanded that 
state's existing, more-limited plan. But that measure was vetoed by the 
Democratic governor, himself a trial lawyer before entering politics25. The 
trial lawyers are greatly assisted in their fight against auto no-fault by 
having, from time to time, the support of certain important consumer 
groups, and, most importantly, the steadfast support of Ralph Nader. 
2.1.2 Ralph Nader's Devotion to the Civil Justice System 
Ralph Nader won his reputation in the U.S. as « Mr. Consumer» in the 
1960s when he campaigned against unsafe automobiles26. At that time, 
General Motors helped make him especially famous by engaging in tactics 
against him that resulted in a lawsuit by Nader against GM for invasion of 
privacy in which Nader won a great deal of money and GM emerged with a 
very black eye27. It seems from the outside at least, that Nader's own 
experience in successfully using the civil justice system to combat wrong-
doing by a large corporation has made him a stalwart defender of tort law 
and the trial lawyers' most important ally. 
Whereas the trial lawyers might be dismissed as merely mouthing 
consumer protection arguments as cover for what is their own self-interest, 
this hardly applies to Nader, who has a reputation for exceptional selfless-
ness and asceticism in his personal life. Some have tried to tar Nader by 
saying that his support for the trial lawyers is based upon the financial 
support they, in turn, supply to some of the organizations he has founded28. 
But I think that most close observers have rejected this claim, concluding 
instead that Nader truly believes in tort law — in all of its reach. 
It is fairly easy to see why Nader would, for example, oppose elimina-
ting product liability suits against major manufacturers, even if they were 
replaced with a generous compensation scheme : this would deprive consu-
mers of the role that some people (including Nader) think that tort law plays 
24. Ibid. See also, A. TOBIAS, loc. cit.. note 20, 175-176. 
25. See A. TOBIAS, loc. cit., note 20, 174-175. 
26. See, e.g., R. NADER and J.A. PAGE, «Automobile Design and the Judicial Process», 
(1967) 55 Cal. L. Rev. 645. 
27. See Nader v. General Motors Corp, 25 N.Y.2d 560, 255 N.E.2d 765 (1970); see also, 
M.A. FRANKLIN and R.L. RABIN, op. cit., note 5, p. 1069 (discussing Nader v. General 
Motors Corp.). 
28. See P. BRIMELOW and L. SPENCER, «Ralph Nader, Inc.», Forbes (17 Sept. 1990) 117 ; 
A. TOBIAS, loc. cit., note 20, 176. 
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in preventing and/or exposing corporate misconduct. And while others 
might believe that a better solution would be a combination of a product 
injury compensation fund and a scheme that rewards whistle-blowers who 
disclose wrong-doing by product makers29, this is an issue on which neutrals 
can conclude that there are reasonable arguments on both sides. Accor-
dingly, Quebec has not broadly replaced tort law for product injuries with a 
compensation plan. 
When it comes to routine auto injuries, however, die story is very 
different. Tort defendants here aren't generally corporations, but rather 
other drivers. It is clear that under U.S. tort law approximately half of the 
bodily-injury, liability-insurance premium paid for auto insurance goes for 
transactions costs, primarily to pay the legal fees of one side or the other30. 
Moreover, of the remainder that is paid out to victims, far more goes as 
compensation for pain and suffering or to duplicate benefits that victims 
already have from health insurance and other sources than is paid to 
compensate for true out-of-pocket economic losses31. 
Still, Nader is adamantly against auto no-fault schemes of all sorts, 
apparently on the ground that Americans have an absolute right to access to 
the civil justice system that cannot be denied to them, and the belief that it 
is important for victims to win as much in pain and suffering as juries or 
settlement will provide32. Nader's opposition has made it very difficult for 
no-fault advocates to convince people in the U.S. that the right sort of plan 
could actually be a great benefit to consumers overall. 
2.1.3 Opposition of the Insurance Industry 
Although most major U.S. auto insurers have supported the so-called 
« modified » auto no-fault strategy, and many would support a comprehen-
sive auto no-fault plan as well, they are, obviously, opposed to certain 
aspects of the Quebec solution. The insurers want to stay in the business of 
29. See generally, S.D. SUGARMAN, Doing Away With Personal Injury Law, Westport, 
Quorum Books, Greenwood Publishing, 1989. 
30. M.A. FRANKLIN and R.L. RABIN, op. cit., note 5, pp. 756-757 (reprinting, Automobile 
Insurance... For Whose Benefit ?, op. cit., note 7, pp. 17-44) ; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, op. cit., note 6, p. 43 (June 1977). 
31. M.A. FRANKLIN and R.L. RABIN, op. cit., note 5, pp. 756-757 (reprinting, Automobile 
Insurance... For Whose Benefit?, op. cit., note 7, pp. 17-44). 
32. See, e.g., R. NADER, « The Corporate Drive to Restrict Their Victims' Rights », (1986-87) 
22 Gonz. L. Rev. 15 ; see also, R. NADER and J. A. PAGE, «Automobile-Design Liability 
and Compliance with Federal Standards », (1996) 64 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 415 (noting that 
tort law is an essential supplement to federal regulation and the proper role of auto-design 
product liability suits is to help reduce the number of traffic accidents and the severity 
of injuries). 
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providing coverage for bodily injury from auto accidents, and Quebec's plan 
gives that business to a government monopoly. Understandably, the U.S. 
companies would not be content merely writing the property damage cove-
rage that private insurers are limited to providing in Quebec. Tobias' Propo-
sition 200, on the other hand, allowed private insurers to continue to sell and 
administer the bodily injury coverage mandated by the plan. Hence, some 
insurers supported it. Yet this support was not terribly enthusiastic, in part 
because these companies thought that the initiative probably wouldn't pass 
anyway and in part because of concerns that open support by insurers 
would make Proposition 200 even less popular. Moreover, some insurers 
didn't like Proposition 200 because they oppose any scheme that will löwer 
the amount of premiums they collect, even if the scheme is more predictable 
and easier for them to administer33. 
In contrast to the insurers' limited support for Proposition 200, when 
Tobias and I earlier circulated auto no-fault proposals that would be funded 
primarily «at the pump» {i.e., with fuel surcharges) the industry totally 
opposed us34. Even though we included the private insurers in our proposals 
as claims administrators (and even though some versions would have al-
lowed them to continue to serve as risk spreaders), the insurers took the 
position that « pay at the pump » involved too much government control for 
their taste; it was, in effect, too much in the direction of the Quebec 
solution. 
This stance, in a broad sense, mirrors the industry's position on workers' 
compensation. The insurers strongly support workers' compensation as a 
nearly complete substitute for tort claims against the employer (which is the 
rule in all of the United States), but they strongly oppose its implementation 
in those few states where the state government has created a single, govern-
ment-run and publicly-owned insurer to handle the business. And the insu-
rers have generally been successful in this opposition, since, in the great 
majority of states, either private workers' compensation insurers are the 
exclusive providers, or else the private firms share the market with a 
competitive state insurer that usually garners only a small portion of the 
employers as customers35. 
33. See A. TOBIAS, loc. cit., note 20, 173, 175. 
34. Id,, at 96-97. 
35. In the U.S. approximately 60% of employers obtain worker's compensation coverage 
through private carriers, approximately 20 % obtain coverage through state funds, and 
approximately 1 % of employers «self-insure» against their employees' injuries. See 
THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, Reports ' Study, Enterprise Responsibility for Personal 
Injury 121, Vol. I, Philadelphia, American Law Institute, 1991. 
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In short, with the trial lawyers, Nader, and the insurance companies all 
against the Quebec auto no-fault solution, political realities alone may fully 
explain why no U.S. state has enacted a similar scheme. 
2.2 Public Perceptions 
Yet, beyond mere politics, opponents of importing the Quebec ap-
proach to the U.S. are able to trade on certain public perceptions that are 
noticeably different in the states as compared with Canada. 
2.2.1 Public Distrust of Government 
For one thing, in the U.S. there is a fairly strong block of voters who 
take a dim view of any proposal that calls for a government agency to run 
the scheme at issue. This does not mean that it is absolutely implausible for 
the Quebec arrangement to be transplanted to the U.S. After all, the Califor-
nia legislature recently created the California Earthquake Authority which 
is charged with the role of making earthquake insurance available to pro-
perty owners36. But this scheme was adopted only because very few private 
insurers were willing to sell earthquake insurance. Additionally, because 
California law required those selling homeowner's insurance {i.e., broad 
«fire and theft» insurance) to offer their clients earthquake coverage as 
well, this was creating a crisis in the availability of the basic homeowner's 
insurance. Nonetheless, a plan to replace the now functioning auto insu-
rance market (there are literally hundreds of companies selling auto insu-
rance in California) with a monopoly public-provider is sure to run into 
widespread skepticism about how efficiently effectively, or fairly the govern-
ment insurer would operate 
2.2.2 Public Distrust of Insurance Companies 
While distrust of government may help explain why the precise Quebec 
solution would face a very high hurdle to its enactment in the U.S., that does 
not explain why a state might not embrace Quebec's treatment of tort and 
no-fault benefits in a way that is administered by the private insurance 
industry (as California's Proposition 200 envisioned). But, here too, we run 
into a public perception problem : the equally widespread distrust of the 
insurance industry. 
36. See generally. West Cal. Ins. Code, Section 10089.5 et seq. ; D. ADAMSON and 
D. MCNARY, « Quest for Quake Insurance Some Californians Finding Fault with 
State—Operated Coverage Plan », The [Los Angeles] Daily News (5 January 1997) Bl. 
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California's Proposition 103, barely passed in 1988 with Nader's sup-
port in the election that saw Proposition 104's no-fault scheme go down to 
defeat, was promoted on the basis that the auto insurers had, in effect, 
conspired to gouge consumers with unreasonably high premiums and then 
to mistreat them when claims were filed37. Furthermore, reflecting distrust 
of insurers, California most particularly, but now more and more states, 
have allowed insurance consumers to file tort actions (entitling winners to 
both open ended awards for pain and suffering and largely unconstrained 
sums for punitive damages) when their insurers in « bad faith » resist paying 
claims38. 
While, of course, the current auto injury compensation scheme also 
relies on the private insurance industry to provide the benefits, at least most 
victims with any sizable claim are able to enlist a lawyer to fight for 
them—a lawyer who can be paid a contingent fee out of the generous pain 
and suffering benefits the lawyer can obtain in the settlement (or trial). But 
comprehensive, auto no-fault is meant to be administered largely without 
lawyers, and there is typically no generous « cushion » in its benefit struc-
ture to pay for legal representation if that is desired. Some people in the U .S. 
fear this will leave claimants, especially low income claimants, at the mercy 
of the insurance companies. 
What all this means to me is that if a comprehensive auto no-fault plan 
to be run by private insurers is proposed and the plan is endorsed by the 
insurers, it will start out facing widespread opposition from the public at 
large. 
2.2.3 Public Skepticism about the Financial Benefits 
Those public misgivings might well be ameliorated if people could be 
convinced that motorists would save a great deal of money under a compre-
hensive auto no-fault scheme like Quebec's. Looking at the Quebec expe-
rience, one ought to be able to conclude that adopting a similar plan, say, in 
California would save motorists billions of dollars. Astoundingly, in Quebec 
the annual premiums motorists pay for no-fault bodily injury protection 
today are not substantially more than they were when the plan was enacted 
20 years ago—$142 (Canadian) for a good driver in 1998, as compared to 
about $100 in 197839. Yet in that same period the benefits paid out under the 
37. See generally, S.D. SUGARMAN, «California's Insurance Regulation Revolution: The 
First Two Years of Proposition », (1990) 103 San Diego L. Rev. 683. 
38. See, e.g., R.C. HENDERSON, «The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party Insurance Transac-
tions After Two Decades », (1995) 37 Ariz. L. Rev. 1153. 
39. In 1997 Quebec motorists paid $112 (Canadian) for their bodily injury protection, paying 
for it in two parts, $87 at the time of vehicle registration and $25 at the time of driver's 
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plan have more than tripled, as wages and other costs have increased 
sharply (if nothing else because of inflation)40. Moreover, a study by the 
RAND Corporation's Institute for Civil Justice found that significant 
savings would occur were California's Proposition 200 adopted41 — savings 
that could be translated into sharply lower auto insurance premiums. Yet it 
is by no means clear that the public believed this about Proposition 200. 
First, and perhaps most importantly, auto no-fault in the U.S. simply 
does not have a reputation as a money-saver for motorists. Of course, those 
in-the-know realize that experience with «add-on» plans is a very poor 
indicator of what would happen under a Quebec-style plan. But for the U.S. 
public, no-fault is an idea that has been around for quite some time now and 
its supporters are hard put to point to places where car owners have come 
out way ahead. Of course, supporters could point to Quebec, but the politi-
cal reality in the U.S. (alas) is that experience from other nations is typically 
not terribly persuasive, especially in this context when there seems to be 
some U.S. experience that is contrary (even if not really analogous) to 
Quebec's. 
This perception about no-fault might be overcome if other « govern-
ment » insurance programs had good track records in terms of saving money 
that could be pointed to by way of analogy. But here too the U.S. track 
record is not attractive. For example, workers' compensation insurance 
rates (another no-fault scheme, after all) have risen sharply over the past 
two decades (in terms of percent of payroll) ; and the U.S. scheme for 
providing public health insurance to the elderly (Medicare) has become 
dramatically more costly in the three decades since its adoption and has 
regularly far out-paced cost projections. 
Altogether, then, it is a very difficult uphill battle to convince the U.S. 
public generally that a no-fault idea imported from Quebec is going to save 
motorists a great deal of cash—even if it will. 
license renewal. In 1998, the amount paid at the time of vehicle registration increased to 
$117, returning to the 1996 level. See interview with André Viel, Chef de Service des 
Études et des Stratégies en Assurance Automobile, Société de l'assurance automobile 
du Québec, email, January 29, 1998. 
40. See SOCIÉTÉ DE L'ASSURANCE AUTOMOBILE DU QUÉBEC, Annual Report, Quebec, 
S.A.A.Q., 1994. Because of inflation, the Canadian consumer price index is 275% of 
what it was in 1978 : interview with Daniel Gardner, Professor of Law, Université Laval, 
email on February 2, 1998. 
41. S. CARROLL and A. ABRAHAMSE, The Effects of a Proposed No-Fault Plan on the Costs 
of Auto Insurance in California, Issue Paper, Santa Monica, RAND Institute for Civil 
Justice, March 1995. 
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2.3 Cultural Traditions 
Even if the public was convincingly shown that legal costs would be 
reduced and motorist premiums would be sharply lowered, Quebec-style 
auto no-fault runs counter to important U.S. cultural traditions. 
2.3.1 Ideological Commitment to Individual Responsibility 
For one thing, there is in the U.S. strong ideological support for the 
notion of individual responsibility, an idea which lies behind tort law and is 
rejected by comprehensive no-fault. Conservatives typically embrace this 
value on many issues, most notably the « crime problem » — which liberals 
have tended to blame, at least in part, on the economy, the education system 
and the like. Recently, the U.S. has addressed « welfare reform » and in this 
round the Democrats, with President Clinton leading the way, joined with 
Republicans in emphasizing the personal responsibility theme. Given this 
bi-partisan support at least in the welfare area, there would surely be 
ideological disinclination to abandon it for motorists. 
Of course, in practice, it is rather misleading to say that the tort system 
holds careless drivers personally responsible for their misconduct. If they 
are uninsured, they are not sued. If they are insured, then it is their insurance 
company that pays. Although this might be translated into higher individual 
premiums the next year, this is a private, not a public, penalty. Moreover, 
since few auto accident cases go to trial, tort law rarely serves the function 
of publicly denouncing the defendant's conduct as improper. Hence, it is 
more the symbolism of personal responsibility that people in the U.S. must 
be reluctant to overthrow for no-fault. 
To be sure, workers' compensation is a no-fault plan that is well 
entrenched in the U.S., and there is no serious move to return workplace 
injuries to the tort system. But there the employer is formally obligated to 
provide benefits for injured workers, an outcome that trades on the idea that 
the employer has control over the workplace and so should take responsi-
bility for what happens there. In auto no-fault, by contrast, rather than 
imposing strict liability on those who crash into other vehicles, drivers must 
look to their own insurers for coverage of accidents that occur in settings 
where the other car's driver could well have been at fault. 
2.3.2 Lack of Support for Collective Responsibility 
The other side of the « personal responsibility » coin is the relative lack 
of ideological commitment in the U.S. to the principle of collective respon-
sibility, at least as compared with Canada. To be sure, there are wonder-
ful stories of people in the U.S. coming to each other's aid in times of 
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emergency, all sorts of disaster relief assistance is provided through govern-
ment programs, and, of course, there is a strong commitment to collective 
responsibility for things like education. But as just noted above, there has 
recently been a retreat from that norm in the public benefits area, and there 
has never been a strong endorsement of it in the health care area, making the 
U.S. in this respect quite unlike most industrially-developed nations. In 
short, in a country where there is, in general, a rather patchy safety net, it is 
not surprising that no special effort has been made to assure compensation 
to victims of auto accidents—despite trie very prominent role that they play 
in the universe of serious and fatal accidents42. Indeed, as noted already, to 
the extent that states have embraced auto no-fault at all, all but two of them 
have excluded from its reach those very victims most in need of a thicker 
safety net — that is, the most seriously injured. 
2.4 Trade-offs 
When Quebec in 1977 embraced comprehensive auto no-fault and 
abandoned tort law for auto accidents, some people were worse off as a 
result. But, on balance, the trade-offs then made seemed quite fair, at least 
to the Quebec government that made the decision. In the U.S., however, the 
trade-offs would be somewhat different and, as explained below, would 
generate stronger objections from the losers (or those who claim to speak 
on their behalf). 
2.4.1 A More Generous Tort Law 
Speaking generally, Quebec's pre-1977 tort law was less generous than 
U.S. tort law. Of course, each state has its own tort law, and so eliminating 
tort recovery as part of a comprehensive no-fault plan would mean some-
thing different from place to place. Moreover, state tort law has changed 
since 1977 so that as it changes the tradeoff also changes. 
For example, at die time Keeton and O'Connell put forward their auto 
no-fault proposal in 1965, the formal law in nearly all states treated the 
contributory negligence of the victim as a complete bar to recovery. Al-
though it was then widely believed that juries commonly ignored this rule, 
it surely played an important role in discouraging some potential claimants 
from filing at all and gave insurers in certain cases extremely strong bargain-
ing positions. By now, nearly every state has adopted a comparative fault 
42. In 1996 there were 43,300 unintentional motor-vehicle deaths, out of a total of 93,400 
unintentional deaths. Also, in 1996 there were 2,600,000 motor-vehicle related disabling 
injuries, out of a total of 20,700,000 disabling injuries. National Safety Council Accident 
Facts (Injury Statistics), http://www.nsc.org (visited on March 9, 1998). 
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regime that, at least when the victim is less at fault than the injurer, merely 
reduces compensation rather than barring it completely43. Indeed, many 
believe that comparative negligence was enacted in many places in the 
1970s, at least in part, in order to blunt the demand for no-fault. 
Also in 1965 several states still had «guest statutes» on their books, 
which generally denied passengers recovery against negligent drivers. Now 
these have all but disappeared44. For these two examples, then, as compared 
to today there would have been many fewer « losers » back in the 1960s had 
comprehensive auto no-fault then been adopted and tort law for auto acci-
dents eliminated. That is, comparatively speaking on those two dimensions, 
even more would have to be given up were the tort regime overthrown today 
instead of in the 1960s. Overall, however, that conclusion must be tempered 
because more recently many states have cutback the amount of damages 
that may be awarded in tort cases. This has had the opposite effect—redu-
cing the amount of recovery that would be given up were comprehensive 
auto no-fault adopted today. 
2.4.2 Especially Generous Awards for Pain and Suffering 
Nevertheless, what is (and was) the most important difference between 
U.S. tort law and Canadian tort law is the much greater generosity in the 
U.S. in the amount of money paid out for pain and suffering, also called 
« general damages. » This difference, which certainly existed in the 1960s, is 
probably even more pronounced today. Moreover, this is the head of da-
mages that Nader and the trial lawyers emphasize in their fight against 
no-fault. 
Several points bear attention here. Perhaps most interesting for the 
U.S. audience is the fact that Quebec's auto no-fault plan actually pays out 
sums for pain and suffering. In 1994, for example, about 12 % of the costs of 
the scheme went to fund such awards45. This is probably quite surprising to 
most people in the U.S. who know anything about auto no-fault, because 
discussions of auto no-fault in the U.S. have almost all been premised on the 
assumption that pain and suffering benefits will not be provided. (Of course, 
if only «modified» plans are being considered, then pain and suffering 
awards are curtailed in only the non-serious injury cases.) 
In any event, the level of the awards for pain and suffering made under 
the Quebec plan is quite modest as compared with U.S. tort law. Although 
43. V.E. SCHWARTZ, Comparative Negligence, 3rd ed., Indianapolis, A. Smith Co., 1994, 
pp. 2-4; R.H. JOOST, op. cit., note 9, pp. 14-15, section 1:3. 
44. R.H. JOOST, op. cit., note 9, p. 16, section 1:5. 
45. SOCIÉTÉ DE L'ASSURANCE AUTOMOBILE DU QUÉBEC, op. cit., note 40. 
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the most seriously-injured claimant will be able to obtain as much as 
$175,000 Canadian starting in 199946, large amounts are rarely awarded, and 
in any case this is more than an order of magnitude less than what can be 
awarded in U.S. cases now. By contrast, in Quebec in 1977 the cutback in 
the amount awarded for this purpose was substantially less. So, to empha-
size the point directly, some U.S. auto accident victims would receive 
enormously less money than they do today (even after paying their legal 
fees) were the Quebec scheme simply transferred to the U.S. 
At least two qualifications to this point are in order, however. The first 
is that a state could always adopt the Quebec plan in general and yet make 
the pain and suffering awards substantially larger. This would, of course, 
make the plan substantially more expensive. But since the U.S. tort system 
is currently so generous in what it awards, uhis means that insurance rates 
are much higher than they would be in Quebec were Quebec to go back to 
its old tort law, and hence, even with a more generous no-fault benefit 
package, there is still considerable room for premium reduction. 
Second, the problem of « uninsured » and « under-insured » motorists 
in the U.S. also reduces the amount that would be given up were compre-
hensive auto no-fault adopted. That is, while some U.S. victims win millions 
for pain and suffering, most victims are unable to recover anything like that 
amount—not because of tort law, but because of the limited ability of their 
victims to pay. Nationwide it is estimated that about 17 % of U.S. drivers 
are uninsured47, and another 50 % have liability insurance in the amount of 
$50,000 (U.S.) or less48. Together these facts mean that, despite tort law's 
superficial generosity, most seriously-injured victims are vastly under-com-
pensated, often recovering only a small share of their economic losses and 
nothing for pain and suffering49. For these victims, a Quebec-style approach 
would actually deliver much better benefits. Still, there is no doubt that a 
46. As soon as the proposed modification to the actual s. 73 of the Automobile Insurance 
Act will be adopted : Loi modifiant la Loi sur l'assurance automobile, Projet de loi 429, 
2e session, 35e législature (Québec), s. 21. 
47. J.D. KHAZZOOM, What We Know About Uninsured Motorists and How Well We Know 
What We Know, Discussion Paper 98-09, Washington, Resources for the Future, De-
cember 1997, Table III.3. 
48. See J. O'CONNELL, « No-Fault Auto Insurance : Back by Popular (Market) Demand ? », 
(1989) 26San Diego L. Rev. 993,1000, note 18 ; S.J. CARROLL and J.S. KAKALIK, No-Fault 
Automoblle Insurance : A Policy Perspective, Santa Monica, RAND Institute for Civil 
Justice, R-4019/1-ICJ, 1991. 
49. See S.J. CARROLL and J.S. KAKALIK, No-Fault Approaches to Compensating Auto 
Accident Victims, Santa Monica, RAND Institute for Civil Justice, RP-229,1993, pp. 278-
281 ; see also S.J. CARROLL et al, No-Fault Approaches to Compensating People Injured 
in Automoblle Accidents, Santa Monica, RAND Institute for Civil Justice, R-4019-ICJ, 
1991. 
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small minority of the gravely injured who are able to sue a defendant with 
very deep pockets would trade off quite a bit of money were a comprehen-
sive no-fault scheme adopted. 
Also, the modestly injured with an insured at-fault defendant to claim 
against would also probably be worse off (and relatively more so than in 
Quebec) under plausible U.S. comprehensive plans. Is this bad ? Many of us 
believe that, in return for a good no-fault scheme, pain and suffering awards 
should be readily abandoned for such victims (most of whose pain and 
suffering is in the past before they see the money paid in compensation). 
Yet, the political support for these very victims appears to be precisely what 
has lead to so many states enacting « add on » plans rather than « modified » 
plans. 
Thus, the general point remains that, in the U.S. setting, the inevitable 
pain and suffering « take away » will loom as a larger trade-off than it did in 
Quebec. This is something which tort defenders make good rhetorical use 
of, especially so long as they don't have to disclose how many U.S. clai-
mants (especially the seriously injured) fail to tap into this bonanza. 
For some tort critics, the idiosyncratic pattern of recovery we observe 
in the U.S. — whether because of insurance availability and amount or 
because of inconsistent jury results or uneven lawyer bargaining ability — 
provides a strong argument for replacing the common law system with a 
reliable and routinely more uniform compensation plan. Yet, it is by no 
means clear that this view would be broadly embraced by the U.S. public. 
That is, it sometimes seems that many people enjoy the lottery-like 
aspect of U.S. tort law that makes some people rich by the luck of the draw. 
This is perhaps consistent with the interest many people in the U.S. have in 
playing lotteries in general. In order to deal with this phenomenon, Tobias 
reported making a wickedly clever proposal to Nader as a way to try to win 
his support. Tobias suggested that a special lottery would be held every so 
often that would be open only to those who had made successful claims 
under the comprehensive auto no-fault plan. Tickets would simply be given 
out to the claimants along with their recovery under the no-fault scheme 
(perhaps with more tickets going to those who had been more seriously 
injured). The lucky winners would get lump sum prizes of various sizes. 
Tobias asserted that results of this lottery would not differ dramatically 
from how tort law in action now works, and yet this lottery would be 
enormously cheaper to administer and fund. We may assume that Nader 
was not amused. 
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2.4.3 The Uninsured Motorist Problem 
As noted above, it is estimated that perhaps one in six car owners in the 
U.S. goes without automobile liability insurance—even though having this 
insurance is compulsory in more than 40 states50. In some places the unin-
sured rate is strikingly higher ; in California, for example, nearly 30 % of 
motorists are thought to be uninsured51. 
It is typically claimed that many of the uninsured are poor people. The 
picture painted by some is that the poor desperately need their old car to get 
to work (given the poor public transportation system throughout most of the 
U.S.), but would have to deprive themselves and their children of food if 
they bought car insurance. While this portrait is surely true of some of the 
uninsured, some suggest that many could afford to buy insurance and 
don't52. It seems that they don't buy partly because they don't expect to be 
in an accident at which they are at fault and don't expect to get caught 
without having the required insurance (since enforcement of the compul-
sory insurance laws has been notoriously lax in most states). But, in addi-
tion, it seems that many of the uninsured just figure that they will be 
essentially judgment-proof if they do happen to cause an accident, and that 
without insurance they just won't be sued. Surely many talk themselves into 
adopting this morally dubious posture because automobile insurance rates 
are so high in the U.S. in large part due to our Rolls Royce-like tort law. 
The prevalence of uninsured motorists has been one of the strong 
arguments in favor of adopting a comprehensive auto no-fault scheme in the 
U.S. Because premiums would come down, more would buy coverage, and, 
more importantly, those who still failed to do so would now be depriving 
themselves of protection instead of their victims. 
But there is another, somewhat bizarre, side of this coin. If a plan like 
Quebec's were adopted, not only would it be compulsory, but also we could 
expect that vigorous efforts would be made to enforce participation. In 
Quebec, for example, uninsured motorists risk having their cars impounded, 
among other penalties. A compulsory, well-policed no-fault scheme would 
help achieve the near universal coverage of accident victims that is intended 
by its designers. Yet, returning to the California data, this would mean an 
50. See INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Insurance Issues Update, New York, Insu-
rance Information Institute, October 1997 (noting 43 states and the District of Columbia 
require liability insurance) ; see also R.H. JOOST, op. cit., note 9, p. 21, section 1:8. 
51. J.D. KHAZZOOM, op. cit., note 47, Table III. 1. 
52. T.E. TROXEL, Ph.D., Remarks at the «No-Pay-No-Play: Addressing The Uninsured 
Motorist Issue» Conference, San Diego, CA (15 December 1997). 
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extra financial burden for the 30 % of drivers who don't buy insurance now. 
Even if the burden were far less than what auto insurance would cost them 
today, it still would be an increase in the out-of-pocket costs of car owner-
ship. Although some would welcome the ability to obtain coverage and 
comply with the law at a modest price, many others would prefer to con-
tinue to « go bare » (especially if the cost in the U.S. were around $300 U.S. 
a year as was envisioned under Proposition 200, rather than the less than 
$150 Canadian charged by the Quebec scheme)53. 
As a result, I imagine that many of today's uninsured drivers would 
oppose an effectively-enforced, no-fault scheme. While their position is a 
difficult one to present in public debate, it nonetheless lurks in the back-
ground and can be acted on individually at the ballot box when initiatives 
are proposed (although it is probably true that the uninsured are very 
disproportionately non-voters). In short, the greater ease with which one 
can be an auto insurance scofflaw is yet another « benefit » of the existing 
U.S. scheme that would have to be traded away were the Quebec solution 
to replace it. 
2.5 Some Policy Concerns About the Quebec Model 
My discussion so far has focused on obstacles to enactment in the U.S. 
of a Quebec-style auto no-fault plan on the assumption that, from a certain 
frame of reference, the Quebec approach is a desirable one. Now, however, 
I want to discuss to some concerns that may be raised about it by objective 
policy analysis. 
2.5.1 Safety Fears 
Perhaps the most important worry is that comprehensive auto no-fault 
generates more auto accidents. Although one might even be willing to accept 
this outcome as part of the price for an otherwise very desirable scheme, 
surely this would be a strong argument against its adoption. Moreover, this 
is exactly the reputation that the Quebec solution has garnered among 
scholars south of the border. This reputation is the result of a variety of 
studies conducted both inside and outside Canada. The two Canadian 
53. Actually, the compulsory Quebec charge is more because one condition of car ownership 
in Quebec is that you carry $50,000 in tort liability insurance for property damages (to 
vehicles and other property). This is privately sold and varies in cost, but $ 179 (Canadian) 
is what a good driver in Quebec City might expect to pay annually. See interview with 
André Viel, Chef de Service des Études et des Stratégies en Assurance Automobile, 
Société de l'assurance automobile du Québec, email, January 29, 1998. 
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studies generally discussed are those of Gaudry54 and Devlin55. Both found 
there were more auto accidents with the Quebec plan than there would have 
been without it. These findings are also consistent with a widely publicized 
study of U.S. no-fault by Landes56 as well as research on no-fault in 
Australia57. 
However, carrying out a convincing study of the impact of no-fault is 
extremely difficult. For one thing, since auto accident rates have been 
dropping generally, the researcher has to try to figure out whether the drop 
would have been greater had tort remained and no-fault not been adopted. 
Two research strategies are : 1) to explore whether the trend-line under tort 
law was shifted under no-fault, and 2) to compare accident rates in matched 
tort and no-fault jurisdictions. But, as with all research of either a time-
series or cross-sectional nature, there are always extremely difficult data 
problems. For example, something else might have happened in the no-fault 
period that accounts for a trend change that should not be attributed to 
no-fault ; and in cross-sectional studies there is always the risk that the 
jurisdictions being compared are different in unmeasured ways, thereby 
again leading to the attribution to no-fault of accident outcomes that were 
actually caused by something else. To overcome these conundrums, very 
complicated research strategies have been employed, frequently using 
highly sophisticated multiple-regression-analysis techniques that are too 
complex for the ordinary reader to evaluate 
At the theoretical level at least three models, containing quite different 
predictions about safety under the Quebec plan, could be constructed. One 
would rest on the idea that fears about harming one's own body, fears of 
getting a traffic citation or facing other criminal charges, and general moral 
54. See M. GAUDRY, «Measuring the Effects of the No-fault 1978 Quebec Automobile 
Insurance Act with the DRAG Model », in G. DIONNE (ed.), Contributions to Insurance 
Economics, Boston, Kluwer Academic Publisher, 1992 ; M. GAUDRY, The Effects on 
Road Safety of the Compulsory Insurance, Flat Premium Rating and No-Fault Features 
of the 1978 Quebec Automobile Act, Prepared for the inquiry into motor vehicle accident 
compensation in Ontario, 1987. 
55. See R.A. DEVLIN, «Liability Versus No-Fault Automobile Insurance Regimes: an 
Analysis of the Experience in Quebec », in G. DIONNE (ed.), op. cit., note 54 ; R.A. 
DEVLIN, «Some Welfare Implications of No-Fault Automobile Insurance», (1990) 10 
Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 193-205 ; R.A. DEVLIN, Liability Versus No-Fault Automobile 
Insurance Regimes: an Analysis of Quebec's Experience, Presented to Canadian Eco-
nomic Association meeting, Windsor, Canada, 1988. 
56. E.M. LANDES, «Insurance, Liability, and Accidents: A Theoretical and Empirical In-
vestigation of the Effect of No-Fault Accidents », (1982) 25 J. L. & Econ. 49. 
57. See R.I. MCEWIN, «No-Fault and Road Accidents: Some Australasian Evidence», 
(1989) 9 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 13-24. 
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feelings about not risking harm to others provide all the deterrence that can 
be achieved. Under this model, tort law has no additional impact on making 
people drive more safely. Therefore, eliminating tort law would not lead to 
a deterioration in driving conduct. 
The second model predicts that, not withstanding those other pressures 
to drive safely, tort law does promote better driving, perhaps due to fears, 
even exaggerated fears, of incurring higher auto insurance premiums. Hence 
this second model would predict worse driving under no-fault. 
Moreover, two other features of the Quebec approach that might 
yield more accidents could be incorporated into this model. For one thing, 
lowered insurance costs make driving more affordable, thereby permitting 
more people to become motorists. That, in turn, would be expected to yield 
more accidents, and especially so if the new drivers are disproportionately 
young people who had been most effectively priced off the highway by a tort 
liability regime that charged them (particularly young men) well more than 
average (assuming, as in Quebec for many years, the state-run, no-fault plan 
charged all drivers the same premium)58. 
Yet, in other areas of life, we don't normally consider the lowered costs 
of a product or service to be undesirable, even if it causes more people to 
use it, thereby bringing about more accidents. For example, if someone 
invents a new type of ski equipment that is no more dangerous than existing 
equipment, but is so much cheaper as to make skiing much more affordable, 
the number of skiers lured onto the slopes would probably increase. Yet, we 
would not object to the introduction of this equipment even if it also meant 
more ski accidents due to the increased number of skiers. 
The second factor is that by providing comprehensive compensation to 
victims, Quebec's plan could have the effect of causing people either to be 
less cautious about injury to themselves or less quick to recover once 
injured. This is often termed the « moral hazard » problem. While « moral 
hazard » could potentially lead to undesirable results, many would be reluc-
tant to forego the Quebec approach on this ground alone. After all, that 
analysis would equally apply to workers' compensation plans, health insur-
ance schemes, private disability schemes and the like. But surely most will 
conclude that the benefit of providing people needed insurance well out-
weighs the moral hazard risk. Further, the risk is typically dealt with by 
providing victims less than full compensation through the plan59. 
58. This was the initial Quebec solution. 
59. Moreover, there is skepticism about whether people really do take increased risks to 
their lives when insurance is available. But it seems that, in the right setting, some do 
so. Of course, if one were to incorporate this moral hazard idea into a model of how a 
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In contrast to this second model that predicts higher accident rates 
associated with the Quebec no-fault plan, a third model predicts lower 
accident rates. The theory here is that when a government agency is charged 
with responsibility for running the scheme that has to charge premiums to 
the public, it will be under great political and public pressure to keep those 
premiums low. As a result, it will also be under pressure to find ways to 
lower accident rates so as to reduce claims on the scheme, through public 
education and specific safety-promotion measures. 
Interestingly enough, despite the early negative empirical findings 
about the Quebec plan on safety grounds, there is now reason to reject those 
results. For one thing, officials running the Quebec plan claim they have 
been highly effective in reducing accident rates and can point to specific 
safety-promoting measures they have generated60. To be sure, without the 
application of sophisticated research methodologies, one should not rely 
too heavily on these officials claims. Yet Gaudry himself has released a 
much more recent study that comes to the opposite conclusion from his 
earlier work—suggesting now that the Quebec plan lowered the accident 
rate more than would have occurred without it61. Furthermore, recent 
critiques have cast doubt on the persuasiveness of Devlin's work62. Finally, 
there are U.S. studies contradicting Landes'63. 
For me, the bottom line is that we should not fear that importing the 
Quebec regime to the U.S. would yield an undesirable increase in auto 
no-fault plan might work, then one would also address the moral hazard aspects of tort 
law. 
60. See SOCIÉTÉ DE L ASSURANCE AUTOMOBILE DU QUÉBEC, op. cit,, note 40. 
61. See M. GAUDRY et al., DRAG-2, un modèle économétrique appliqué au kilométrage, 
aux accidenss et à leur gravtté au Québec—Partie 4—Application du modèle aux 
accidents, à leur gravtté et aux victimes de la route, Direction des études et des analyses, 
Société de l'assurance automobile du Québec, May 1995 ; M. GAUDRY et al,, DRAG-2, 
un modèle économétrique appliqué au kilométrag,, aux accidents et à leur gravité au 
Québec — Partie 1 — Estimation et analyse du kilomérrage et des victimes ddaccidents 
de la route au Québec entre 1957 et 1989, Direction des études et des analyses, Société 
de l'assurance automobile du Québec, October 1993 ; M. GAUDRY et al., Appiication of 
econometric model DRAG-2 to the frequency of accidenss in Quebec according to 
different levels of severity Proceedings of the 8 th Canadian Multidisciplinary Road 
Safety Conference Saskatoon Saskatchewan June 1993 
62. See, e.g., N . GLICK and J. BERKOWITZ, Statistical Evidence of fatality increases in 
responee to « no-fautt » insurance ?, Paper prepared for the Insurance Corporation of 
British Columbia (unpublished). 
63. See P. E X E T E R and A. L U N D , «Re-analysis of the effects of no-fault auto insurance on 
fatal crashes », (1986) 53 J. Risk & Ins. 226-241 (critiquing Landes statistical regressions 
and conclusions) ; see also P.S. KOCHANOWSKI and M.V. YOUNG, «Deterrent Aspects 
of No-Fault Automobile Insurance : Some Empirical Findings », (1985) 52 J. Risk & Ins. 
269-288. 
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accidents. Moreover, it is not necessary to embrace the flat fee rules that 
prevailed in the early years in Quebec. Motorists with bad driving records 
could easily be charged more ; indeed, since 1992 Quebec has done exactly 
that by making bad drivers pay extra to renew their driving licenses64. 
Furthermore, unlike Quebec, young drivers, or novice drivers generally, 
might be charged an additional surcharge for their first three years on the 
road (with a refund of some or all of that surcharge if they were accident-
free for those three years)65. 
2.5.2 Cost Fears 
The Quebec experience ought to allay cost fears. Although overall 
program costs certainly have increased, for example from just under $500 
million Canadian in 1990 to over $700 million Canadian in 1994, neverthe-
less, as noted earlier, the insurance cost to motorists — if adjusted for 
inflation — is decidedly less than what it was 20 years ago. It is important to 
appreciate, however, a major contributor to today's low cost is that the 
government agency in charge wound up in the early years with far more 
premium income than was necessary to pay claims and wisely invested this 
surplus. As a result, about 40 percent of the cost of the system is now paid 
for by investment income66. U.S. insurers, of course, also enjoy investment 
income on premiums (since they collect in advance) which in turn holds 
premiums down somewhat. But the relative amount of investment income 
available to the Quebec authorities is larger than would typically occur in a 
competitive market. Hence, if Quebec's system today enjoyed only the 
average amount of investment income obtained by a U.S. insurer of compa-
rable size, the Quebec premiums would have to increase (although they 
would have been still lower in the earlier years). Nevertheless, it seems 
reasonably clear that even if Quebec had to pay for the full cost of its plan 
out of current premiums (and earnings on those premiums), although the 
rates would go up they still would be less in 1998 than they were in 1978 in 
real terms that is if discounted for inflation. 
However, as previously pointed out, the U.S. experience with workers' 
compensation has been far worse. Because of that experience, some people 
in the U.S. will want to hold down the cost of a comprehensive auto no-fault 
plan by making its benefits secondary to payments by health insurance 
64. See SOCIÉTÉ DE L'ASSURANCE AUTOMOBILE DU QUÉBEC, op. cit., note 40; R.H. JOOST, 
op. cit., note 9, p. 21, section 7:5. 
65. See, e.g., S.D. SUGARMAN, « Pay at the Pump » Auto Insurance : The Callfornia Vehicle 
Injury Plan (VIP) for Better Compensation, Fairer Funding, and Greater Safety, 
Berkeley, Institute of Governmental Studies Press, 1993, p. 18. 
66. SOCIÉTÉ DE L'ASSURANCE AUTOMOBILE DU QUÉBEC, op. cit., note 40. 
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plans and other sources like Social Security. Moreover, this approach has 
certain administrative attractions — most importantly avoiding the transac-
tions costs of one insurer recouping from another. Nevertheless, hypersen-
sitivity to health care costs in the U.S. today may make this a particularly 
bad time for that sort of cost-shifting. The upshot is that a state importing 
the Quebec scheme to the U.S. might simply have to take it on faith that it 
could approximate Quebec's ability to control costs as compared with U.S. 
experience in workers' compensation. 
A quite different cost concern arises from die size of the benefit 
package under the no-fault plan as compared with the typical liability 
insurance benefit package. Today, as noted already, most U.S. motorists 
carry either the minimum allowable auto insurance (often only $10,000-
25,000 U.S. per person injured) or else modest amounts above the minimum 
($50,000 U.S. or less). If the auto no-fault plan is to be truly comprehensive 
it will have to provide a far higher dollar level of coverage than $50,000 U.S. 
This, of course, will make the program commensurately more expensive. 
Proposition 200 in California sought to deal with this issue by making 
the default insurance policy have a benefit maximum of $1 million (with 
certain internal limits, for example, on wage replacement), while at the same 
time permitting buyers to opt, if they wish, for a cheaper plan with only 
$50,000 of coverage. This has the advantage of allowing the plan's pro-
moters to emphasize how little one would pay for a $50,000 policy. Yet if 
most people were actually to buy that coverage, this would leave many 
seriously injured victims substantially under-compensated. Of course, as 
noted, $50,000 is all that many seriously injured victims now obtain, and 
here it would be a matter of consumer choice. Still, there is some reason to 
fear that too many people would buy less coverage now and later be very 
regretful. On the other hand, again, forcing everyone to buy the $1 million 
coverage makes the plan relatively less attractive as a money-saving pro-
posal compared with the current regime, and understandably makes the 
initiative more difficult to sell to the voters in 30 or 60 second sound bites 
that dominate most election campaigns. After all these reforms come at a 
time when motorists are far more likely to respond favorably to insurance 
premium reductions than to distant promises of better benefits in case they 
are badly injured Still although I recognize the difficulty of the judgment 
that was involved I am not convinced that the promoters of Proposition 
200 dealt with these competing considerations in the wisest manner 
I do agree that the cost problem is most importantly confronted in the 
details of the program's design. That is, the real cost and cost escalation 
worries, I believe, depend upon the precise nature of the benefits provided. 
But before tolerating a ceiling of $50,000 for those with no other sources of 
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compensation, other avenues should be pursued. For example, one would 
want the medical benefits to be offered in ways that take advantage of the 
sorts of sensible and fair cost containment strategies now beginning to be 
used in the U.S. in workers' compensation and health insurance plans ; one 
would want to be careful that rehabilitation benefits are provided in reaso-
nably proper amounts where they can be effective and not lavishly wasted ; 
and one would want to avoid over-generosity in the level of replacement 
services benefits provided. Indeed, the drafters of Proposition 200 were 
very mindful of at least some of these very points. Nonetheless, I believe 
that with these sorts of internal controls and limits in place, sufficient 
financial savings could be promised to today's drivers even in a plan with 
$1 million benefit maximum. 
I have not yet mentioned legitimate concerns about fraudulent claims. 
Workers' compensation and health care schemes in the U.S. face this 
problem, and surely a comprehensive auto no-fault plan would as well. 
Indeed, fraud in the non-fault aspects of auto and homeowners' insurance 
is an ongoing problem. But the concern here ought to be a comparative one, 
since, alas, the automobile liability system in the U.S. is allegedly rife with 
fraud. There are ongoing reports of staged accidents, deliberate accidents, 
deliberate malingering after accidents, claims to reimburse the cost of medi-
cal services that were never rendered, and the like. Some argue that U.S. 
auto liability insurance premiums are 10-20% higher than they would be 
without this sort of fraud670ô48%20ô 
67. The Coalition Against Insurance Fraud estimates that there was $13.4 billion in auto-
mobile insurance claims fraud in 1994 based upon the National Insurance Crime Bureau 
estimate of a 16.44% fraud rate. Http://www.InsuranceFraud.org/press (visited on 
March 9, 1998). 
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No doubt, the present system especially encourages fraud because of 
the availability of open-ended pain and suffering damages. This is the grease 
that draws together, for example, the crooked lawyer and doctor with the 
willingly fraudulent claimant. By pretending to have medical needs, the 
economic losses claimed are increased, thereby also increasing the amount 
of pain and suffering obtainable in settlement, and generating extra funds for 
the lawyer and for the cheating patient. 
I am convinced that this sort of fraud would be less popular in a plan 
that didn't pay pain and suffering benefits, or at least didn't pay the amounts 
now paid in the U.S. Yet, on the other hand, since fault would no longer be 
an issue, other types of smaller-scale fraud would be encouraged. Still, on 
balance, especially since fraud does not seem to a matter of serious concern 
in Quebec, there is reason to hope that the fraud problem would become 
smaller were Quebec's auto no-fault plan adopted in the states. 
2.5.3 Slippery-Slope Fears 
Some no-fault critics, probably Nader, worry that comprehensive auto 
no-fault would be just a foot in the door to the adoption of other no-fault 
arrangements, arrangements they far more strongly oppose. Others hope for 
exactly that—auto no-fault leading to, for example, no-fault coverage of 
medical accidents, pharmaceutical drug injuries, recreational injuries, and 
the like68. If the Quebec experience is to be any guide, auto no-fault might at 
first be seen as a step in the direction of other no-fault plans. That is, 
Quebec's auto no-fault plan was followed by a liberalizing reform of the 
province's workers' compensation scheme, a similar revision of the scheme 
to compensate victims of violent crime (now not in force), and the adoption 
of a scheme to compensate those who suffer side-effects from vaccinations 
against disease69. Moreover, there is now some discussion in Quebec about 
68. See, e.g., P.C. WEILER, Medical Malpractice on Trial, Cambridge, Harvard University 
Press, 1991 (advocating for no-fault for medical accidents) ; R. MERRILL, « Compensation 
for Prescription Drug Injuries», (1973) 59 Va. L. Rev. 1 (advocating no-fault for pres-
cription drug injuries) ; J. O'CONNELL, « No Fault Liability by Contract for Doctors, 
Manufacturers, Retailers, and Others », (1975) Ins. L. J. 531 (advocating no-fault regimes 
for a variety of injuries). 
69. Act Respecting Industrial Accidents and Occupational Diseases, L.Q. 1985, c. 6 (French 
version at L.R.Q., c. A-3.001 ) ; Act Respecting Assistance and Compensation for Victims 
of Crime, L.Q. 1993, c. 54 (not yet in force; will replace the 1971 Act Respecting 
Compensation for Victims of Crime and copy the automobile scheme in respect of 
compensation levels) ; Act to Amend Various Legislation Respecting Social Affairs, 
L.Q. 1985, c. 23, s. 18, adding ss. 16.1 to 16111 to the Public Health Protection Act, L.R.Q., 
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how accidental victims of medical treatment might be covered on a no-fault 
basis. 
On the other hand, in the years since Keeton and O'Connell proposed 
auto no-fault in the U.S., we too have witnessed a substantial liberalization 
of workers' compensation, the widespread adoption of (fairly ineffective) 
programs for compensating victims of violent crime, and the enactment of 
a national childhood vaccine injury scheme. In addition, there has been 
much talk in the U.S., although not any action yet, about handling the 
medical injury problem on a no-fault basis. Put differently, to the extent that 
Quebec has slid down the « slippery slope, » so has the U.S. — but without 
a Quebec-style auto no-fault plan to lead the way. 
This suggests to me that « slippery slope »-fearing opponents of com-
prehensive auto no-fault should not be so fearful, and « foot-in-the-door » 
proponents should not feel so hopeful. 
3. Creeping Toward the Quebec Solution ? 
Although no U.S. state has yet followed the Quebec auto insurance 
precedent, perhaps in future years that will occur, or at least we will see 
moves in that direction. Just because California's Proposition 200 was 
defeated and Hawaii's comprehensive no-fault plan was vetoed does not 
mean that those ideas are dead, especially as other changes are afoot that 
could facilitate their rejuvenation. 
3.1 Auto No-fault « Choice » Plans 
Realizing that « add-on » plans were probably making things worse, and 
that trial lawyer political power continues to block state legislative enact-
ment of comprehensive no-fault, O'Connell and others have proposed a 
« choice » scheme under which individual motorists can elect to be in either 
the fault system or the no-fault system. O'Connell's argument is that it 
should be harder for the lawyers to defeat something that is a matter of 
consumer choice—as compared with conventional no-fault which is forced 
on everyone. His assumption, however, is that once given the choice, the 
vast majority of motorists would elect no-fault because of its lower cost and 
in some circumstances far better benefits. 
But so far the trial lawyers, who can read the tea leaves too, have been 
able to block choice plans. And at least one time it was put to the voters of 
a state (in Arizona) advocates found they were outmatched by the lawyers' 
c. P-38, expressly referring to the Automobile Insurance Act in respect of compensation 
levels (s. 16.3). 
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campaign and the proposal was badly defeated70. Hence, O'Connell and 
others have now taken their campaign to Congress where, at least for the 
moment, Republicans, who aren't so beholden to the plaintiffs' bar, wield 
considerable political power. Yet, it is by no means clear that this approach 
is going to get anywhere any time soon. 
3.2 Pay at the Pump 
While this is not the place to discuss pay at the pump schemes in detail, 
suffice it to say that policy analysts have proposed several auto compensa-
tion plans that would be funded primarily with surcharges on the purchase 
of gasoline (or other vehicle fuels). These proposals are usually tied to 
no-fault benefit schemes although that does not necessarily follow. They 
have certain politically desirable attributes. First, they would largely elimi-
nate the uninsured motorist problem in the sense that all drivers would have 
to pay into the plan since everyone would have to buy gasoline and rela-
tively little fraud is likely. Second, pay at the pump is attractive to environ-
mental groups, public transportation advocates, and those concerned about 
energy-efficiency because they appear to promise a combination of less 
driving and the purchase of more fuel-efficient vehicles. 
To be sure, pay at the pump plans currently seem politically remote, if 
nothing else because they bring out the opposition of the « highway lobby » 
that a) favors more driving rather than less {e.g., motel owners, fast food 
restaurateurs, freeway builders, the oil companies, etc.) and b) jealously 
guards the principle that « gas taxes » should be used only for the building 
and maintenance of roads. 
Nevertheless, pay at the pump could possibly become the stalking 
horse for a Quebec-style plan—a lesser of evils that insurers and others 
could get behind to forestall pay at the pump. 
3.3 Crackdowns on the Uninsured Motorist 
Throughout the U.S., the public seems up in arms about the uninsured 
motorist problem. This has prompted the adoption of increasingly tougher 
sanctions against the uninsured including high fines, driving license suspen-
sion, vehicle confiscation and so on. Many thoughtful observers find these 
growing penalties draconian, especially when levied against poor people 
with few options. 
Most recently, an approach called « no pay, no play » has been pro-
moted71 and has so far been adopted in a few states, including California. It 
70. See R.H. JOOST, op. cit., note 16, p. 26, section 1:2C. 
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comes in two versions. In both, anyone who is uninsured and hurt in an auto 
accident has his right to recover in tort limited. The idea is that since he 
belongs to a class of drivers who aren't paying their fair share of money into 
the plan, then members of that class should be restricted in what they draw 
from the plan when they sue. In California such motorists are denied pain 
and suffering damages ; in Louisiana they are forced to bear some of their 
own out of pocket losses72. One version of « no pay, no play » limits tort 
recovery in addition to any other penalties already imposed on uninsured 
motorists ; in the second version, tort limits are imposed instead of other 
penalties — in effect, one is permitted to go without liability insurance so 
long as he agrees that he won't recover fully in tort if he is injured. 
My goal here is not to discuss the merits of the various approaches to 
the uninsured motorist problem. I want only to emphasize what was noted 
earlier. Under comprehensive no-fault, the uninsured motorist problem has 
an entirely different meaning. Instead of cheating someone you negligently 
injure out of recovery, your failure to insure only hurts you (and perhaps 
your own family). Hence, if these escalated attacks on the uninsured moto-
rist do not achieve satisfactory results, this might be another pressure for 
moving to Quebec-style no-fault as a different way to combat the uninsured. 
Conclusion 
I believe that adoption in California of a Quebec-style comprehensive 
automobile no-fault plan (perhaps administered by the private sector), 
would be a great benefit to most consumers and to most victims (especially 
those who are most seriously injured). Possibly, a few years of good expe-
rience with the Quebec model in Manitoba and Saskatchewan will demons-
trate its export potential. Or, perhaps we just need to get Nader to spend a 
lot of time in Quebec. 
71. See, e.g., J. O'CONNELL, «Allowing Motorists a Choice to Be Legally Uninsured by 
Surrendering Tort Claims for Noneconomic Loss (With Some Further Thoughts on 
Choices Between PIP and Tort Coverage) », (1995) 1 Conn. Ins. L. J. 33. 
72. In California, the « no pay, no play » law was passed by, as Proposition 213, by 76 percent 
of Californian voters in November 1996. The constitutionality of Prop 213 is currently 
on appeal to the California Supreme Court ; however, two lower courts of appeal have 
sustained Prop 213's constitutionality. In Louisiana, the no pay, no play law—formally 
called the Omnibus Premium Reduction Act of 1997, or Act 1476— is also under cons-
titutional attack. The law is currently on appeal to the Supreme Court of Louisiana. See 
also, INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, Insurance Issues Update, R. GASTEL (ed.), 
New York, Insurance Information Institute, October 1997. 
